In-life imaging of animals challenged experimentally with infectious agents greatly enhances the quality of data gained from a pathogenesis or efficacy study. This additional information also presents an opportunity to address ethical issues by refining the studies and reducing the number of animals used. Both magnetic resonance (MR) and computed tomography (CT) imaging modalities are used extensively in human medicine to diagnose disease and to monitor the efficacy of treatments. To make animal-based studies as relevant as possible to the clinical situation, such technologies must be applied wherever possible. Imaging animals infected with disease-causing agents presents a number of challenges for programs that assure health and safety as well as the well-being of the animals during the scanning process.
Introduction
The Public Health England (PHE) Research Department at Porton (PHE Porton) has a directive to conduct research on novel interventions for current and newly emerging infectious diseases that threaten human health. This agreement includes a requirement to respond to biothreat emergency situations that may result from natural occurrences or from deliberate release. In order to develop new therapeutics or vaccines it is currently necessary to use relevant animal models to characterize the disease and then to test immunogenicity, safety, and the protective efficacy of interventions such as vaccines.
To optimize the clinical relevance of animal models, reproducing the disease as seen in humans and applying the latest technology to monitor disease progression are essential. In addition, the application of technologies such as imaging addresses the ethical requirements to gain as much information as possible from an animal and to define the earliest intervention points that provide robust data on efficacy. Models that maximize pathogenesis and efficacy data speed up the progress of a vaccine or therapy to the clinic and may reduce the requirement for, or inform the design of, clinical trials in humans.
The use of experimental animals infected with dangerous infectious agents poses a unique problem in terms of safe containment that protects staff working with the animals and that prevents release of such agents into the environment. To this end, facilities in the United Kingdom (UK) need to meet the stringent requirements of biocontainment levels 3 or 4 (CL3, CL4) as defined in the UK by the Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP). Containment strategies depend upon an organism's hazard group (HG) classification and the risks associated with possible routes of transmission. The use of advanced imaging modalities such as computed tomography (CT) and magnetic resonance (MR) imaging presents additional problems in terms of safe containment during the transfer and imaging of subjects while also maximizing the use of such expensive equipment. Such equipment is complex and uses either X-rays (CT) or strong magnetic fields (MR) that require specialized facilities with appropriate screening barriers that shield operators and adjacent facilities.
In a multi-program facility where more than one infectious agent may be in use at any given time, an additional problem must be considered. This involves the decision to either avoid the contamination of imaging equipment or to decontaminate the equipment between scanning sessions or programs of work. The challenge with such complex equipment is that many surfaces are either unreachable or may be sensitive to exposure to chemicals validated for successful decontamination by fumigation. Furthermore, investment in such technologies is considerable in terms of capital outlay, maintenance costs, and the hiring of specialized staff capable of designing suitable protocols for each species and operating the equipment successfully. Because the technology is continually improving in the field of human medical imaging, a fiscal risk is associated with the purchase of a piece of equipment that may soon become outdated.
With these factors in mind, the PHE Porton team made the decision to establish proof of principle for the utility and validity of using both CT and MR imaging by designing a mobile containment pod that facilitates the safe transfer of infected animals from the contained husbandry area to a mobile scanner hired for use and brought onsite only when required.
Materials and Methods

Experimental Animals
Animals used in proof of principle imaging were rhesus macaques infected with ACDP HG3 agent Mycobacterium tuberculosis by nose-only exposure to an aerosol using established procedures (Harper & Morton, 1962; Sharpe et al., 2009 ). All animals were derived from the PHE breeding colonies and were housed in socially compatible groups according to the Home Office (UK) Code of Practice for the Housing and Care of Animals Used in Scientific Proce-Articles A Flexible Approach to Imaging in ABSL-3 Laboratories Mike J. Dennis 1 *, Simon Parks 1 , Gordon Bell 2 , Irene Taylor 1 , Jody Lakeman 1 , and Sally A. Sharpe 1 dures (Home Office, 1989) and the UK National Committee for Refinement, Reduction and Replacement (NC3Rs) Guidelines on Primate Accommodation, Care and Use (NC3Rs, 2006) .
Contained Husbandry Units
Once challenged with a HG3 agent, all animals are housed in a directional flow containment system (Dennis, 2010) , such as that shown in Figure 1 , that was designed to allow group housing, remote telemetry, and operator protection appropriate for working with macaques infected with respiratory agents. The system was designed with flap valves such that a minimum inward flow of air of 0.5 M per second was maintained at all times when accessing the animals for feeding, cleaning, or sedation.
Contained Imaging Pod
The pod used to transfer and to image subjects was designed with the following requirements in mind:
• Rapid, safe transfer of animals from the containment housing suite into the pod using rapid transfer docking ports (RTPs) • Easy movement of the pod to the mobile imaging truck while maintaining operator protection at all stages • All components of pod to be compatible with both Xray and magnetic resonance modalities • Easy access to the animal to rearrange body position for injection of contrast medium or for emergency intervention for welfare reasons • Facility for administration and safe discharge of gaseous anesthesia • Facility for monitoring physiological parameters throughout the process
Testing for Imaging Compatibility
Before committing live animals to a study, a mock-up of the imaging section of the pod was constructed during the development phase to ensure that all construction materials were compatible with both MR and CT equipment and that no image artifacts were created with either modality. Initial tests were conducted using frozen poultry containing pre-packed selected viscera (typically liver, kidneys, and gizzard).
In Vivo Testing
For comparative in-life imaging studies, individual animals were sedated. An over-the-needle catheter was inserted into the saphenous vein to allow rapid administration of contrast material or additional anaesthetic, and a cuffed intra-tracheal tube was inserted to allow anesthesia to be maintained through carrier gases. This setup also allowed for brief breath-holding strategies, if required. As previously mentioned, transfer of animals from the containment suite to the pod was accomplished by using a RTP incorporated into an airlock door of the suite and into one end of the pod. The anesthetised animal was secured into an image-compatible infant restraint that allowed safe transfer without disturbing placement of the intravenous catheter or intra-tracheal tube.
Development of the Imaging Pod
The initial isolator pod was designed with a dual layer system to provide secure primary and secondary levels of containment. This design enabled a single anesthetised primate to be transported from a CL3 or CL4 facility to a mobile CT and/or MRI scanner, be scanned, and then be returned to the facility. Through the entire process, life Articles Figure 1 Containment System Directional airflow support was provided to the nonhuman primate and the high level of containment was not compromised.
The isolator components were selected and manufactured to minimize magnetic attraction to the strong magnetic field produced by the MRI scanner. Sample components and materials were tested in a mobile MRI scanner to determine their magnetic attraction under operational conditions. Where it was necessary to use stainless steel, such as the RTP, the quantity of stainless steel was minimized and the components were located as far as possible from the scanner.
The system included an internal pod scanning section manufactured from radiofrequency (RF)-welded clear polyvinyl chloride (PVC) at 0.5 mm thickness, with 3 mm thick polypropylene bands to support the canopy and to maintain the shape. This scanning section was connected to a thermally formed and welded rigid PVC ventilation and docking section, fitted with dual primary HEPA filters on supply and exhaust ducts. This primary pod was then housed in a secondary PVC film isolator, again fitted with dedicated dual, in-line HEPA filters on supply and exhaust ducts, to ensure two levels of containment when used for HG4 work.
To access the dual layer system, two latex gauntlets (long gloves) were mounted on shoulder rings and fitted to the front and back canopy wall panels of the main canopy section. Two latex gauntlets were mounted on shoulder rings and fitted to the front and back isolator canopy wall panels on each side of the pod section of the isolator canopy. All gauntlets fitted to the pod were positioned in-line with gauntlets fitted to the isolator canopy. The front panel of the chamber was fitted with a type 350 Beta Rapid Transfer Port with support brackets and a diaphragm transfer sleeve, while the back panel of the chamber was fitted with a type 270 Alpha Rapid Transfer Port, (Eurobioconcept, Saint Honoré, Paris, France). Two latex gauntlets were fixed to each side of the Transfer Chamber.
The base trolley worktop and base shelf were manufactured from non-porous, machined, solid white PVC, 12 mm thick, and the top and bottom chamber panels were fitted with aluminum reinforcing plates and aluminum connection tubes. Supply and return decontamination ports were fitted to enable the chamber to be decontaminated by formaldehyde gas or H 2 O 2 vapor.
The pod was fitted with double in-series HEPA panel filters (Camfil™, Stockholm, Sweden) for the passive air supply, drawn by the fan-induced negative pressure from the surrounding isolator workspace. Exhaust air was pulled through the two in-series exhaust HEPA filters fitted to the pod and ducted directly to the two in-series pod exit HEPA filters fitted to the isolator. There were individual Disperse Oil Particulate (DOP) scanning ports for each filter. Air was pulled through the two isolator-mounted exit filters by the exhaust fan located in the mobile ventilation and controls unit and then out to the atmosphere or to a suitable exhaust point. The ventilation system provided a minimum of 15 volume air-changes per hour at a negative pressure of -40 Pascal's. The air change rate was adjustable up to 20 per hour for rapid purging of the fumigation gas after decontamination.
To provide for gaseous anaesthetic and other nonvolatile medical gases, the pod was also fitted with respiratory tubing, valves, couplings, and double in-series highefficiency breathing system filters. These high-efficiency Filta-Guard™ filters (Intersurgical, Workingham, Berkshire, UK) were designed for use in breathing systems in anesthesia and intensive care to protect the patient, hospital personnel, and the equipment from potential microbial contamination. The Filta-Guard™ range has been validated to protect against the passage of Hepatitis C virus and Mycobacterium tuberculosis in addition to standard test microorganisms.
Initial material compatibility testing revealed that producing a ventilation system that would be fully compatible with the MRI scanners was not possible; hence, the system was designed with a separate mobile ventilation system.
When in operation within the MRI Scanning Trailers, the mobile ventilation and controls unit would then be located in the trailer preparation room, adjoining the scanner room. A PVC airline fitted with gas-tight, snap-fit, quickconnect couplings connected the exhaust fan, pressure differential gauges, and alarm system through a pipe spigot on the trailer bulkhead to the Transfer Containment Isolator. The left side panel on the pod was fitted with a service plate for future connection of a multi-pin plug for the Philips Medical MRI scanning coil (Phillips, Best, The Netherlands).
An automatic battery back-up system provided uninterrupted transfer to battery power should the main electrical supply fail or when the isolator was disconnected from the main electrical supply during transfers for a period up to 12 hours.
Final Modifications for the Mycobacterium tuberculosis Project
The original two-layer design was driven by the need to develop a prototype system suitable for work at CL4, but as will be discussed later, this endeavor led to a number of operational difficulties and, hence, the system was simplified for use with current CL3 projects. For this work, the internal pod was removed, leaving a single-skinned film isolator.
Containment Isolator Safety Evaluation
PHE Porton has been using containment isolator technology for over a decade and has developed significant expertise in the design and validation of such systems. All of our containment isolators undergo a full range of performance tests every 6 months, to ensure that continued high levels of containment and operator protection are provided.
The tests outlined below ensure that the performance is inline with that of Class III glove boxes, as described in the current BS EN12469 standard (BS EN12469, 2000) and meets the current guidance from the UK regulator (ACDP, 1995 (ACDP, , 1997 .
The following tests are undertaken to ensure correct operation:
• Tests of all HEPA filters using the DOP method, with 99.997% retention • Determination of airflow and air change rates, and maintenance of negative pressure • Positive pressure scan test, using DOP of the whole enclosed system, followed by pressure decay tests • Tests on the operation of alarms and indicators While these systems have been in use for many years, little published data on their effectiveness exists. As a result, PHE Porton has undertaken significant validation work, using the biological tracer test methods described below to evaluate the systems in use. For this work, the concept of operator protection factors (OPF) (BS EN12469: 2000) has been employed to indicate the performance, with a factor 10 5 being the target level; this level equates to a release of no more than 1 particle in 100,000. This level of Articles Figure 2 Diagram of the Scanning Pod
Figure 3
Pod Docked to Containment System performance is the same as that specified for Class I or II safety cabinets.
Previous internal studies (unpublished) have shown that with all standard procedures, specifying operations such as animal transfers with the use of RTPs, waste removal, transfer of samples, and a wide range of foreseeable systems failures, PHE Porton has maintained a high level of containment.
However, as this work required portable isolators to leave the physical confines of the facility, there was a requirement to prove the robustness of the systems beyond normal use to ensure compliance with UK requirements. To this end, a number of additional, sometimes destructive, tests were also performed on a similar film transfer isolator to ensure that in the event of accidents, containment would be maintained.
Aspects of operator protection that required testing: • Safe transfer of animals into the pod using the RTP • Maintenance of negative pressure differentials between the inner and outer pods • Modifications to simplify the pod for CL3 work • Integrity of air filters, anesthetic, and scavenging filters • Ability to withstand impact • Safe transfer into the scanner using RTPs, with consideration for dexterity and ergonomics Articles Figure 4 Transfer to Scanner via Lift Figure 5 Sliding the Pod onto the Scanner Bed
Methods Testing Operator Protection Factors Test Isolator
A transfer isolator of similar construction, which was nearing the end of its operational life, was fully tested using the established physical testing methodologies listed above. This isolator was then used for a range of impact and physical damage tests to determine operator protection factors (Lever et al., 2008) . Any damage occurring during the tests was repaired using duct tape, which has been found previously to be effective for temporary repairs. No additional integrity tests on the isolator were performed during or after the biological tests.
Microbial Aerosol Generation
A spore suspension of aero-stable Bacillus atrophaeus (NCTC 10073) was used for this study. A high-spore concentration suspension was prepared by the PHE Production Division under pharmaceutical conditions (Sharp et al., 1989) , which was washed three times in distilled water and heated to 60ºC for 1 hour to kill any vegetative cells. This original primary suspension was then stored at 4ºC prior to use. The test suspension for this study was then prepared by making a suitable dilution of the original primary stock into distilled water, which was then heat shocked at 60ºC for 15 minutes to ensure that only viable spores were present. This suspension was assayed using serial dilutions and plated onto Tryptone Soy Agar (TSA, Biomerieux, France) plates (incubated at 37±2ºC overnight) to achieve a spore concentration of ca. 3 x 10 9 colony forming units (CFUs). Two Collison 6-jet nebulizers (BGI, Waltham, Massachusetts) were used for aerosol generation within the isolator, each filled with 20 ml of the test suspension operating at 26 PSI.
Microbial Air Sampling
Cyclone Sampler-Two cyclone samplers (Hampshire [R&D] Glassware Ltd., Southampton, Hampshire, UK), operating at ca. 650 l min -1 and using sterile Articles Figure 6 Pod in Place in Mobile Scanner. Due to an MRI scanner's strong magnetic field, the isolator exhaust ventilation fans, alarm system, electrical components, switches and gauges have been removed from the isolator and housed on a small trolley-the mobile ventilation and control unit are normally located in the preparation room adjacent to the scanner room when the scanning procedure is in progress.
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distilled water as a collecting fluid, were used to measure the microbial aerosol concentration in the room at the front and the back of the isolator. Casella Slit Sampler-Two 30 l min -1 Casella slit samplers (Casella, Kempstone, Bedfordshire, UK) containing Tryptone Soya Broth agar (TSBA) plates were also used to measure the microbial aerosol concentration within the room. One of the Casella samplers was positioned at the front of the isolator and one at the back.
All Glass Impinger-All glass impingers (AGI) manufactured onsite (MRE Porton, Salisbury, Wiltshire, UK), operating at 11.5 l min -1 and containing 10 ml of sterile distilled water as the collecting fluid, were used to measure the concentration of the aerosol challenge inside the isolator.
Microbial Analysis
The collection fluid from the cyclone and AGI samplers was diluted and plated out on TSBA plates. All the TSBA plates were incubated for 24 hours at 37ºC before being counted.
Testing Methodologies
Tests were carried out in triplicate, unless otherwise stated, to measure protection factors under the conditions below. These test conditions did not relate to the standard use of the equipment, but were intended to simulate the misuse of the equipment and possible accidents which would occur only under extreme conditions or through a disregard for normal operating procedures. A. To simulate colliding with surfaces during transport, an isolator was pushed into a wall with considerable force. B. To simulate a door handle catching the canopy and damaging it, a large (> 20 mm diameter) metal pole was used to strike the canopy with such force as to punch a hole through the canopy, leaving approximately a 30 mm opening. C. A glove cuff was crushed and broken by trapping it between a wall and the isolator frame. D. To simulate very rough movement with significant damage to a glove/sleeve that has not been repaired or sealed (one test only), a cuff and glove were removed and the isolator was continually pushed into a wall, as above. E. To simulate a result of dragging the isolator across a sharp object and, hence, damaging the sleeve, a > 6 cm long rip in the sleeve was made. The isolator was then moved around the room for a few minutes, as if the damage had not been detected, then finally the hole was sealed with tape. F. To simulate very significant damage, a cut > 40 cm was made to the main body of the isolator. This damage was left unsealed for 1 minute before being sealed with duct tape.
The standard testing procedure for all the experiments was initiated at time zero when all the samplers and the nebulizers were switched on. After 2 minutes, the Collison nebulizers were switched off. After 5 minutes, the AGI and all the external samplers were switched off.
Operator Protection Factor
The results of these tests have been expressed as operator protection factors (OPF) calculated as follows:
If the OPF were greater than 10 5 for all tests, then this value could be regarded as acceptable performance, equivalent to a biological safety cabinet.
Results
Testing for Imaging Compatibility
Tests using the prototype pod showed very little distortion of images using either MR or CT modalities. With MR, a faint outline of the pod was seen around the image of the subject, but this artifact was easily factored out when processing the image for analysis.
Evaluation of the Dual Isolator System
The dual layer isolator was tested using the standard tests above, with both parts of the system tested independently and working together. Results showed that both of the isolator layers passed the tests without any significant issues, but the evaluation of the ergonomic factors showed that the dual layer isolator, specifically the use of double layers of gauntlets, led to a significant loss of dexterity. Hence, while the system had been shown to give exceptional levels of containment, it was considered to be ergonomically flawed and in need of further development. As the dual layer system had been developed to give an additional level of assurance for CL4 work, the isolator was modified, with the internal pod being removed. The single layer isolator was then re-tested and passed using the methods described above and the operational performance was then reevaluated. With the simplified design, it was found that the operators now had acceptable levels of dexterity and visibility, with additional space within the isolator to allow for more effective positioning and care of the animals.
In Vivo Testing
Anaesthetic protocols were established for both imaging modalities. Results showed that while a regime of induction with injectable agents (ketamine and medetomidine) followed by gaseous anesthesia using a cuffed intratracheal tube was best for MR imaging, the shorter duration of image capture required for CT allowed the use of injectable anesthetics alone. Thus, within the biocontainment suite, subjects could be fully anesthetised, fitted with an intravenous catheter for injection of the contrast medium, and then transferred to the imaging pod; this simplified the imaging and transfer process considerably. High-quality images of lung disease, lymph node enlargement, and extrapleural lesions were obtained by using this regime without the use of breath-holding strategies.
The design of the pod allowed full access to the subject for clinical inspection, maneuvering into suitable imaging positions (both prone and supine), maintenance of gaseous anesthesia, brief breath-holding for MR, and injection of contrast material or other agents as required. While the pod was designed to enable scanning of subjects exposed to either HG3 or HG4 agents, the testing model involved Mycobacterium tuberculosis (TB)-infected animals. With this purpose in mind, the ergonomics of the process could be improved, while still providing robust operator protection, by removing the inner compartment of the pod such that animals could be accessed and manipulated through a single set of gauntlets.
Containment Pod Safety Evaluation-Tracer Crash Tests
The average operator protection factors are detailed in Table 1 .
Test Type A-Rough handling: No evidence of any release of test spores from the isolator was detected during any of these tests; the level of airborne spores recovered was not significantly above the background levels.
Test Type B-Piercing canopy: No evidence of any release of test spores from the isolator was detected during any of these tests; the level of airborne spores recovered was not significantly above the background levels. A considerable force was required to puncture the canopy of the isolator, a very unlikely scenario.
Test Type C-Crushing glove ring: No evidence of any release of test spores from the isolator was detected during any of these tests; the level of airborne spores recovered was not significantly above the background levels. A considerable force was required to break the glove cuff with only one successful attempt in the three tests, a very 
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Surface Reconstruction of CT Image of Lung and Liver unlikely scenario. When the cuff broke, the glove remained in place, being held to the sleeve by the tape normally used to seal it. Test Type D-Rough handling without glove: Results showed that in the tests above the glove and cuff did not detach from the isolator during the simulated accidents; hence, the glove was removed to create a worst-case scenario. This breach recorded the lowest OPF of 2.58 x 10 4 . This scenario would be extremely unlikely.
Test Type E-6 cm rip in sleeve: A leakage of test spores was detectable in all of these tests, but OPFs of greater than 10 5 were still achieved in all three tests.
Test Type F-40 cm rip in canopy: A leakage of test spores was detectable in all of these tests, but OPFs of greater than 10 5 were still achieved in two of the tests, with one test recording an OPF of 5.74 x 10 4 .
Discussion and Conclusions
Pod Evaluation
While the initial dual layer design gave very high levels of performance, its impact on dexterity and usability left it unsuitable for the intended purpose. However, the design gave good insight into the balance between engineering solutions and the hands-on nature of animal work, where the physical risks, such as sharps and animal bites, are often greater than the possible aerosol risk. Hence, when a riskbased approach was applied to the TB project, it became clear that the single skin layer option was more appropriate, and the rigorous validation work had shown that even under accident scenarios, the performance was very high.
The crash test validation work has given an extra level of assurance to the use of these systems outside the primary containment barrier, demonstrating that high levels of portable containment are achieved even under hypothetical extreme accident conditions. This testing has been important both in gaining approval for this work from the UK regulators and in assuring our partners, who supplied the mobile scanner trucks, that the risk of contamination to their equipment is insignificant. It must also be clearly stated that the staff undertaking this work have been trained to the highest levels and the extreme scenarios investigated would very rarely if ever occur under normal working conditions.
In Vivo Imaging
While results showed that satisfactory images could be obtained using both MR and CT, these modalities have strengths and weaknesses depending on the areas to be examined. Thus, MR gave excellent images of the brain and abdominal soft tissues, while CT was the modality of choice for capturing images of tuberculotic lungs. The use of contrast material greatly enhanced the ability to visualize enlarged or necrotic lymph nodes and extra-pulmonary TB lesions in, for example, the spleen, kidneys, or liver.
The use of imaging has greatly enhanced the scientific power of the macaque inhalation TB model (Rayner et al., 2013) by allowing the use of clinically relevant, lowchallenge doses, and has addressed ethical issues by allowing the use of reduced numbers of subjects for shorter studies without reliance on progression to overt disease. Test Type E-6 cm Rip in Sleeve 1.09 x 10 6
Test Type F-40 cm Rip in Canopy 9.15 x 10 4 † No release of bacterial spores above background levels.
